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PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL:
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY
Robert B. Thompson t
I
INTRODUCTION
Piercing the corporate veil is the most litigated issue in corpo-
rate law' and yet it remains among the least understood. As a gen-
eral principle, corporations are recognized as legal entities separate
from their shareholders, officers, and directors. Corporate obliga-
tions remain the liability of the entity and not of the shareholders,
directors, or officers who own and/or act for the entity. "Piercing
the corporate veil" refers to the judicially imposed exception to this
principle by which courts disregard the separateness of the corpora-
tion and hold a shareholder responsible for the corporation's action
as if it were the shareholder's own. The boundaries of this excep-
tion are usually stated in broad terms that offer little guidance to
judges or litigants in subsequent cases. In 1926, Benjamin Cardozo
described this corner of the law as "enveloped in the mists of meta-
phor,' 2 and courts and commentators have been even less kind in
t Professor of Law, Washington University. Research support for this project was
provided by a Treiman Fellowship of the Washington University School of Law. Arbi
Ben Abdallah provided invaluable assistance in the statistical aspects of this project, and
Deborah Rush provided research assistance. The paper benefited from the comments of
Charles Adams, Ian Ayers, Doug Branson, James Cox, John Drobak, Theodore Eisen-
berg, Ed Greenberg, Frank Kennedy, Stephen Presser, Larry Ribstein, Roberta Romano,
Tom Sullivan, and William Wang. The paper was presented at the first meeting of the
American Law and Economics Association in May, 1991. I am responsible for any re-
maining deficiencies.
I This project started with about 2000 cases found in Westlaw, using the search
terms, "piercing the corporate veil" and "disregard! the corporate entity" and four
Westlaw key numbers. A similar search of Lexis inJuly, 1990 also turned up about 2000
cases. By comparison, "corporate takeover" and "hostile takeover" (among the hottest
corporate law topics in recent years) appear in fewer than 300 cases. A search for "fidu-
ciary duty" and "corporate" or "director" turned up more than 4000 cases, but that
topic includes a multitude of different issues.
2 Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry., 244 N.Y. 84, 155 N.E. 58 (1926) (opinion by Cardozo,
J.), reh'g denied, 244 N.Y. 602, 155 N.E. 914 (1927). Justice Cardozo wrote:
The whole problem of the relation between parent and subsidiary corpo-
rations is one that is still enveloped in the mists of metaphor. Metaphors
in law are to be narrowly watched, for starting as devices to liberate
thought, they end often by enslaving it. We say at times that the corpo-
rate entity will be ignored when the parent corporation operates a busi-
ness through a subsidiary which is characterized as an 'alias' or a
'dummy'. All this is well enough if the picturesqueness of the epithets
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subsequent years. Legal writers have described judicial decisions to
pierce the veil as "irreconcilable and not entirely comprehensible," 3
"defy[ing] any attempt at rational explanation," 4 and occurring
"freakishly." 5
Much of the criticism, like Cardozo's comment, is directed more
at the form and language of the decisions than at the results. A
common refrain in the literature is an attack on the use of con-
clusory terms, such as "alter ego" and "instrumentality,"' 6 that
provide no insight into the nature of the factors considered. Com-
mentators lament that the same facts appear in cases providing re-
lief and cases denying relief 7 in an unpatterned mingling of relevant
with neutral facts that has stymied constructive analysis.8 The law is
presented as offering completely antithetical doctrines9 which
courts are at liberty to utilize or ignore, depending upon the results
desired. o
Despite this barrage of negative reviews, many believe that be-
neath this layer of unhelpful language courts are getting it right. An
early scholar in this area, Elvin Latty, observed that, "in spite of con-
flicting and misleading dicta the judicial hunch usually carries
through to a correct decision."" Adolf Berle wrote, "It]he various
reasons, fictions, arguments and important considerations are many,
diverse, and frequently inconsistent; but the scheme of these various
does not lead us to forget that the essential term to be defined is the act
of operation. Dominion may be so complete, interference so obtrusive,
that by general rules of agency the parent will be a principal and the sub-
sidiary an agent. Where control is less than this, we are remitted to the
tests of honesty and justice.
Id, at 94-95, 155 N.E. at 61.
3 PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS
IN THE LAW OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS 8 (1983).
4 Jonathan M. Landers, A Unified Approach to Parent, Subsidiay & Affiliate Questions in
Bankruptcy, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 589, 620 (1975).
5 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability & the Corporation, 52 U.
CH. L. REV. 89, 89 (1985).
6 Robert W. Hamilton, The Corporate Entity, 49 TEX. L. REV. 979, 979 (1971); see
Elvin R. Latty, The Corporate Entity as a Solvent of LegalProblems, 34 MIcH. L. REV. 597, 621-
30 (1936); Note, Judicial Supervision of the One-Man Corporation, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1084,
1089 (1932).
7 See Comment, Disregarding the Corporate Entity: Contract Claims, 28 OHIo ST. LJ.
441, 450 (1967) (authored by David C. Cummings) ("IT]he factors of an instrumentality
are more or less present in all cases where relief against a shareholder ... is sought.");
see also FREDERICK J. POWELL, PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS 9 (1931); Easter-
brook & Fischel, supra note 5, at 109; William P. Hackney & Tracey G. Benson, Share-
holder Liability for Inadequate Capital, 43 U. Prrr. L. REV. 837, 843 (1982).
8 John F. Dobbyn, A PracticalApproach to Consistency in Veil-Piercing Cases, 19 U. KAN.
L. REV. 185, 188 (1971).
9 E.R. Latty, A Conceptualistic Tangle and The One-Or-Two-Man Corporation, 34 N.C.L.
REV. 471, 472 (1956).
10 Note, supra note 6, at 1086.
11 Latty, supra note 6, at 630.
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exceptions is none the less consistent and logical enough."'12 More
recent scholarship has echoed these conclusions, 13 with some nota-
ble dissent arguing that current law is inadequate to deal with the
concerns of tort victims 14 or the problems of corporate groups.' 5
Much of the legal scholarship in this area reflects scholars' ef-
forts to reveal the decisional structure beneath the verbal shabbi-
ness of the law's facade. This search has produced checklists of
varying lengths 16 as well as more general theories of factors that
should produce different results. For example, commentators have
suggested that contract cases should be treated differently from tort
cases, 17 or predicted that corporations with individuals as share-
holders will be treated differently in a piercing context than corpo-
rations with other corporations as their shareholders.,,
This empirical study evaluates these claims about piercing the
veil cases by analyzing the nature of the corporations, the plaintiffs,
the courts, and the reasons given by the courts for piercing or not
piercing the corporate veil. The results suggest that the factors af-
fecting the judicial outcome are not necessarily as suggested by pre-
vious commentary. For example, courts pierce less often in tort
than in contract contexts, and a piercing decision is not less but
more likely when the shareholder behind the veil is an individual
rather than another corporation. Other results confirm prior pre-
dictions. For example, the likelihood of piercing increases as the
number of shareholders decreases. Factors frequently cited by com-
mentators, such as misrepresentation and undercapitalization, do
make a difference, but this difference is more pronounced in con-
tract settings than in tort or statutory settings.
The results of analyzing the entire data set demonstrate that the
12 Adolf A. Berle, The Theory of Enterprise Entity, 47 COLUM. L. REv. 343, 345 (1947).
13 See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 5 (economic analysis-in particular the
theory of the firm and the economics of insurance-explains the legal treatment of lim-
ited liability).
14 Note, Should Shareholders Be Personally Liable for the Torts of Their Corporations?, 76
YALE L.J. 1190 (1967) (authored by Arden Doss, Jr.) (limited liability thwarts the objec-
tive of modem tort law).
15 Phillip I. Blumberg, The Corporate Entity in an Era of Multinational Corporations, 15
DEL.J. CORP. L. 283, 328 (1990) ("the much criticized, irreconcilable, and unpredictable
nature of such decisions should leave no doubt as to the fundamental inadequacy of
traditional entity law to deal with the problems presented by the new corporate world").
16 See, e.g., Cathy S. Krendl &James R. Krendl, Piercing the Corporate Veil: Focusing the
Inquiry, 55 DEN. L.J. 1, 52-55 (1978) (a 31 point checklist); F. POWELL, supra note 7, at 9
(listing 11 factors for application of instrumentality rule).
17 See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 5, at 112; Hamilton, supra note 6, at
984.
18 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 5, at 111; Landers, supra note 4, at 619 (histori-
cal background indicates that limited liability was never intended to protect a parent
corporation against liability for the debts of its subsidiary).
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question of piercing the veil is contextual. Most significantly, pierc-
ing occurs only in close corporations or within corporate groups; it
does not occur in public corporations. When piercing does occur,
the courts' reasoning varies with the context, and decisions reflect
the differing impact of various statutory policies affecting limited lia-
bility. The traditional reasons for piercing work best in bargain or
contractual settings and less well in torts or statutory cases. Part II
of this Article provides an overview of the law of piercing the corpo-
rate veil. Part III describes the methodology used in this project.
Part IV describes the empirical results of the project, particularly as
they affect various theories put forward in this area. The final part
offers some conclusions as to piercing-the-veil law that can be drawn
from the empirical results.
II
THE LAW OF PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL
A fundamental principle of corporate law is that shareholders in
a corporation are not liable for the obligations of the enterprise be-
yond the capital that they contribute in exchange for their shares. 19
A corollary of this principle is that the corporation is an entity sepa-
rate from its shareholders, directors, or officers. 20 Such limited lia-
bility was not always the rule in American law, 2' but it has been
accepted in most American jurisdictions since the mid-nineteenth
century.22
Limited liability permits parties to allocate the risk of an enter-
prise to a more efficient risk-bearer in particular circumstances. The
possibility that the failure of a business would allow its creditors to
reach all of an investor's nonbusiness assets might deter a risk-
averse investor from investing, even though that possibility is small
and the investment has a positive net present value. Limited liability
encourages these investments. 23 Creditors of a limited liability en-
terprise bear more risk than do creditors of an identically funded
enterprise where the creditors can pursue the nonenterprise assets
of the investors. Creditors who choose to deal with a limited liabil-
ity enterprise accept this risk and can raise their prices to reflect this
19 See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACr § 6.22(b) (1985).
20 The separate entity principle has many other implications not discussed here,
such as the entity's ability to transfer property, to sue, and to be sued.
21 Phillip I. Blumberg, Limited Liability and Corporate Groups, 11 J. CORP. L. 573, 587-
91 (1986) (describing early American law providing for shareholder liability).
22 Id. at 591-95 (limited liability was the rule by the middle of the nineteenth cen-
tury with several exceptions that continued into the twentieth century).
23 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 5, at 97 (limited liability increases funding
availability for projects that have positive net values, but carry too much risk in terms of
potential to wipe out all of the investor's capital).
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difference in risk or can seek security.24 This shift in potential liabil-
ity from shareholders to creditors produces gains for society if the
creditors are more efficient in evaluating or bearing particular
risks. 25 However, even if creditors are sometimes better risk-bear-
ers, limited liability also shifts risks in other situations to claimants
who had no choice in dealing with the enterprise (for example, tort
victims or small uninformed creditors). To this extent, limited lia-
bility shifts some costs of doing business away from the corporation
to other parts of society.26
Limited liability encourages development of public markets for
stocks and thus helps make possible the liquidity and diversification
benefits that investors receive from those markets.27 Without lim-
ited liability, the risk each investor would face in investing in an en-
terprise would turn in part on the wealth of other investors. 28 Such
a system would have search costs and other costs which would likely
lead investors to make a few larger investments where risk-assess-
ment information was accessible, and perhaps entail a reduced level
of economic activity across the entire economy.29
The separateness of the corporate entity, most often used to
protect those behind the veil from additional liability, also serves to
24 Roger E. Meiners, James S. Mofsky, & Robert D. Tollison, Piercing the Veil of Lim-
ited Liability, 4 DEL. J. CORP. L. 351, 361 (1979) ("when an individual contracts to limit
his liability or has it limited by law, market conditions force him to pay a price for limited
liability").
25 Richard A. Posner, The Rights of Creditors of Affiliated Corporations, 43 U. CHI. L.
REV. 499, 501-02 (1976) (creditors might be superior risk bearers because they are less
risk averse or have superior information). But see Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 5, at
91 (presumption that creditors are more risk averse is implausible; superior information
can explain some, but not all, of limited liability). One example of a creditor who may
be a more efficient risk evaluator is a seller of a business who extends credit to finance
the sale. A seller taking back a note for a purchase price might be better able to evaluate
whether the business can produce sufficient income to pay off the note than the pur-
chaser would.
26 Blumberg, supra note 21, at 616-19 (limited liability fundamentally unfair to tort
victims and other involuntary creditors and has undesirable consequences for labor
claimants with severe informational disabilities and lack of ability to diversify and to
absorb loss).
27 Henry G. Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REV.
259, 262 (1967) (publicly held corporations with many small shareholders could not
exist without limited liability).
28 Paul Halpern, Michael Trebilcock & Stuart Turnbull, An Economic Analysis of Lim-
ited Liability in Corporation Law, 30 U. TORONTO L.J. 117, 130-31 (1980); Susan E. Wood-
ward, Limited Liability in the Theory of the Firm, 141J. INsTrrJTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON.
(ZErrscHRIFr FUR DIE GESAMTE STAATSWISSENSCHAFT) 601, 604-05 (1985). Proportional
liability has been suggested as a response to these market concerns. See HENRY
HANSMANN & REINIER KRAAKMAN, THE UNEASY CASE FOR LIMITING SHAREHOLDER LIABIL-
rY FOR CORPORATE TORTS (1990).
29 Cf STEPHEN PRESSER, PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL 1-12 (1991) (arguing for a
"democratic" justification for limited liability designed to encourage individual invest-
ment by those of moderate means as opposed to firms owned only by the wealthy).
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insure the shareholder's entitlement to certain benefits that would
not be available if the line between the corporation and its share-
holders were disregarded. For example, shareholder-employees of
a corporation may qualify for social security30 or unemployment
benefits31 that would be reduced or unavailable if the corporation
were disregarded. A separate entity may also be used to divide
those parts of an enterprise which are subject to specific govern-
ment regulation, such as insurance, banking, securities, or commu-
nications, from other parts of the enterprise that do not fall within
the regulated area. The unregulated part of the business is free of
the costs of regulation that it might not avoid were the enterprise
considered as a whole.3 2
These purposes support the general rule that the separateness
of a corporation from its shareholders will normally be respected.
Yet this principle is not absolute, and courts regularly disregard the
entity when its separateness is used for illegitimate purposes. A fed-
eral court at the turn of the century summarized the reasons to over-
come separateness as "when the notion of legal entity is used to
defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend
crime."33 Professor Ballantine was even more general: "it comes
down to a question of good faith and honesty in the use of corporate
privilege for legitimate ends."3 4
Resolution of a piercing question is almost always left to a
judge's determination of corporate illegitimacy. Almost all state
corporations statutes simply ignore the whole idea of piercing the
corporate veil. The Model Business Corporation Act provides that
shareholders are not personally liable for the acts or debts of the
corporation unless the articles of incorporation provide otherwise
or the shareholder becomes personally liable "by reason of his own
30 See Markarian v. Califano, 473 F. Supp. 671 (W.D.N.Y. 1979) (Social Security
Administration could not pierce the veil of a close corporation to decrease a claimant's
eligibility for benefits on the grounds that earnings were to be considered as coming
from a sole proprietorship).
31 See Roccograndi Unemployment Compensation Case, 197 Pa. Super. 372, 178
A.2d 786 (1962) (holding shareholder/employees to be self-employed and ineligible for
benefits where claimants had sufficient control to lay themselves off) (reported at 178
A.2d 786 (1962) as Roccograndi v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review).
32 See Johnson & Higgins v. Comm'r of Ins., 321 So. 2d 281, 281-85 (Miss. 1975)
(statute requiring disclosure of the shareholders of any company applying for an insur-
ance license did not require disclosure of shareholders of such a company's parent). But
see General Tel. Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 846, 855 (5th Cir. 1971) (regulations that
restrict activities of telephone common carriers apply to noncarrier subsidiaries of car-
rier parents).
33 United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co., 142 F. 247, 255 (C.C.E.D.
Wis. 1905).
34 Henry W. Ballantine, Separate Entity of Parent and Subsidiary Corporations, 14 CALIF.
L. REV. 12, 19 (1925).
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acts or conduct."35 That last phrase is not further defined, nor is
there any hint as to how much, if any, of the common-law doctrine
of piercing the corporate veil is to be covered by this phrase. As the
official comment to section 6.22 states, the section "sets forth the
basic rule of nonliability of shareholders for corporate acts or debts
that underlies modem corporation law." 3 6 Delaware's statute per-
mits a corporation to include in its certificate a provision imposing
personal liability, but otherwise the stockholders are not "person-
ally liable for the payment of the corporation's debts except as they
may be liable by reason of their own conduct or acts."37
A recent exception to this legislative silence is a 1989 Texas
statute that limits a shareholder's liability for fraud arising from a
corporation's contractual obligations "unless the obligee demon-
strates that the [shareholder] caused the corporation to be used
[for] actual fraud .... primarily for the direct personal benefit of the
[shareholder]." 38 Another provision purports to block shareholder
liability for a corporation's contractual obligations based on absence
of corporate formalities.39 That statute appears to be a response to
a Texas case that pierced the corporate veil on very broad
grounds,40 and it seeks to toughen case law at least in contractual
contexts. But the statute's focus on fraud and informalities ad-
dresses neither noncontractual contexts nor the many other reasons
courts give for piercing the veil in a contractual context, such as
undercapitalization and commingling of funds. The Texas statute
still leaves courts as the primary law-makers for piercing the veil.
35 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Ac-r § 6.22(b) (1985).
36 See id. § 6.22 official comment. Section 7.32(f), a 1990 proposed amendment to
the Model Act, would provide some legislative guidance on piercing the veil where
shareholders of close corporations enter agreements to eliminate or restrict the power
of the board or otherwise provide for less formal corporate governance. Action pursu-
ant to such an agreement
shall not be a ground for imposing personal liability on any shareholder
for the acts or debts of the corporation even if the agreement or its per-
formance treats the corporation as if it were a partnership or results in
failure to observe corporate formalities otherwise applicable to the mat-
ters governed by the agreement.
Changes in the Revised Model Business Corporation Act-Amendments Pertaining to Closely Held
Corporations, 46 Bus. LAw. 297, 301 (1990). Similar laws already exist in several states.
See CAL. CORP. CODE § 300(e) (West Supp. 1991); Tax. Bus. CORP. ANN. art. 12.37(f)
(Vernon Supp. 1991); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.995(20) (West Supp. 1990). No effect of
the statutes on judicial opinions is yet observable.
37 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 162(b)(6) (1983).
38 TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.21A(2) (Vernon Supp. 1991).
39 Id. art. 2.21A(3).
40 Castleberry v. Branscum, 721 S.W.2d 270, 273 (Tex. 1986) (to pierce a corpo-
rate veil, a plaintiff need only prove constructive fraud, which is "the breach of some
legal or equitable duty which, irrespective of moral guilt, the law declares fraudulent




The growth in federal legislation since the 1930s has changed
the judicial role somewhat. Some statutes, like the federal securities
laws, explicitly cover controlling shareholders and may explicitly
mention subsidiaries or affiliates. 41 Other statutes use more generic
terms such as "employer," ".owner," or "operator," leaving defini-
tion of the scope of the terms to subsequent development.42 Courts
must determine if the specific statutory policy mandates less respect
for the corporate form than would arise from the usual application
of corporate law alone.
The continuing reliance on case instead of statutory law, and a
parallel judicial reliance on case-by-case resolution in lieu of far-
reaching standards, reflects the nature of the conduct being regu-
lated. As with insider trading4 3 and much of the law of directors'
fiduciary duties,44 additional specification may not be possible with-
out inviting greater abuse, as investors and their lawyers plan trans-
actions to avoid specific terms of the law.45 For example, state
corporations statutes limit the dividends that may be paid to share-
holders, 46 but this bright-line rule has not removed the need for
"piercing" as an alternative constraint to regulate shareholders who
leave their corporation with few assets. Courts and legislators have
chosen to rely on after-the-fact adjudication based on general prin-
ciples in lieu of more specific standards.
This uncertainty in legal standard does not, however, reduce
the business participant's desire to predict ultimate judicial out-
comes. Toward that end, this project seeks to provide some empiri-
cal data on the factors used by courts in deciding whether to pierce
the corporate veil.
41 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78t (1988) (liability of control persons). See generally PHILLIP
I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: PROBLEMS OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY
CORPORATIONS UNDER STATUTORY LAW OF GENERAL APPLICATION § 1.01 (1989), catego-
rizing "specific" statutes and "general" statutes and describing how some statutes have
been transformed from general statutes to specific statutes.
42 See PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, supra note 41, § 1.01 nn. 6 & 7.
43 Congress has not defined insider trading, leaving the law to evolve on a case-by-
case basis.
44 Although, there has been some movement to codify directors' fiduciary duty in
the last 20 years. See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT. § 8.30 (1985) (fiduciary duty remains
judge-made law).
45 See I. MAURICE WORMSER, DISREGARD OF THE CORPORATE FICTION AND ALLIED
CORPORATION PROBLEMS 37-38 (1927) (suggesting that an effort at codification is "not
only impossible but preposterous").




THE METHODOLOGY OF THIS PROJECT
A. The Data Set
This project includes all Westlaw cases through 1985 concern-
ing the issue of piercing the corporate veil. 47 Those cases that did
not address corporate law were eliminated from the initial set of
2000, leaving a pool of about 1600 cases for which both factual and
analytical data were collected. 48 The factual data compiled from
each case included: whether or not the court pierced the veil; year;
court; which jurisdiction's law was being applied; the number of
shareholders in the corporation that was the object of piercing;
whether a person or an entity was behind the corporate veil; the
person or entity seeking the piercing; the substance of the claim
(contract, tort, criminal law, or a specific statute); and whether or
not the claim involved procedure. 49
In addition to this factual data, the reasons courts gave to ex-
plain their decision to either pierce or not pierce the corporate veil
were collected. These were less objective than the inquiries made
above and reflected a judgment by the court to cite the presence or
absence of certain factors. The data-gathering form included a uni-
verse of eighty-five reasons gleaned from previous research in the
area and a sampling of the cases in the data set. These reasons were
grouped into several major categories: undercapitalization; 50 fail-
ure to follow corporate formalities; 5' overlap of corporate records,
functions or personnel;52 misrepresentation;5 3 shareholder domina-
47 The search included the terms "piercing the corporate veil" and "disregard of
corporate entity," and the appropriate Westlaw key numbers. For the precise search
term, see supra note 1. The earliest date of the cases varied depending on the breadth of
the various Westlaw libraries; there were almost no cases prior to 1930, and only a hand-
ful each year until the mid-1950s. See infra Table 2.
48 The data was collated from the cases by Rebecca Arnold, John Butrus, Cynthia
Day, Paula Decker, Michael Mermal, Paul Rachlin, and Sherry Rozell, all now graduates
of the Washington University School of Law.
49 The factual data gathered also included subordination as an alternative to the
piercing/no piercing outcome. Eight subordination cases were found but because of the
small number, they are not included in this analysis.
50 "Undercapitalization" was subdivided into those cases in which undercapitaliza-
tion was present at the beginning of the corporation's life and those cases in which the
corporation became undercapitalized later.
51 "Informalities" was subdivided into matters relating to meetings, records, or
other informalities.
52 The "overlap" category separately tabulated overlap in meetings, directors, busi-
ness activity, owners, management, bank accounts, hiring and firing decisions, books,
contracts, insurance policies, advertising, corporate acts, officers, assets, records, tax re-
turns, stationery, personalities, employees, tariffs, retirement plans and organizational
charts. If a court listed two or more of these categories, each item was recorded.
53 This category included both misrepresentation as to the corporation's assets and
financial condition, and misrepresentation as to the party responsible for payment.
1044 [Vol. 76:1036
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tion;54 intertwining and lack of substantive separation;55 use of the
conclusory terms "alter ego" 56 and "instrumentality"; 57 the general
ground of fairness; 58 assumption of risk;59 refusal to let a corpora-
tion pierce itself;60 and statutory policy.61 Courts frequently give
more than one reason for their decisions; multiple reasons were re-
corded where listed by the court.
B. Methodology Questions
This study provides data beyond that previously assembled on
Courts sometimes use "fraud" language to describe these claims, but in most cases the
misrepresentation is less than that required to recover under common-law fraud (or
some codification of that rule of law). Indeed, if the plaintiff had a good fraud case, she
would probably have pleaded it. See Krendl & Krendl, supra note 16, at 31 ("fraud [is]
difficult to prove, and the quantum of evidence available in most corporate veil cases is
considerably smaller than would be required to carry the burden on a fraud claim").
54 "Shareholder domination" includes such conduct as the shareholder paying cor-
porate expenses or continuing losses, paying salaries of corporate employees or guaran-
teeing corporate debt, owning all of the stock of the corporation, treating the
corporation as a department, or the corporation engaging in no independent action.
55 This category is closely related to shareholder domination. It provided a place
to separately identify commingling of funds or siphoning of corporate funds, the share-
holder treating corporate assets as its own, and other intertwining activities. A separate
category was used to identify cases for which the court described the relationship be-
tween corporation and shareholder as an agency relationship.
56 A court's perception that a corporation is merely the "alter ego" of its sharehold-
ers is a common reason given for piercing the veil. It is frequently attacked by commen-
tators for its conclusory nature. See, e.g., Latty, supra note 6, at 625; Note, supra note 6, at
1086.
57 Whether a corporation is nothing more than an "instrumentality" of its share-
holders has long been used as a test for piercing the veil, see F. POWELL, supra note 7, at
8-9, but it too has received much abuse from commentators. See, e.g., Easterbrook &
Fischel, supra note 5, at 109; Hackney & Benson, supra note 7, at 843 (instrumentality of
too uncertain meaning to express any legal test).
58 Several commentators have said that the question comes down to fairness. See,
e.g., supra text accompanying note 34. Courts, too, are sometimes satisfied with the
reason. Courts include a general reference to equity, fairness, or justice as a reason for
piercing in 135 cases in the data set.
59 The "assumption of risk" category was designed to capture those cases in which
courts addressed specifically whether participants contracted with a corporation and
thereby assumed the risk that the corporate assets would be insufficient to pay the debts.
60 Self-piercing cases use terminology similar to piercing cases, but the chances of a
court allowing such piercing are much less. In self-piercing, the corporation asks the
court to pierce the veil to entitle the enterprise to a benefit that would not be available if
the corporation were considered separate from its shareholders.
61 "Statutory policy" could be derived from statutes, treaties, or foreign law. The
"judicial reasoning" part of the form did not separately identify statutory policy, but the
factual part of the survey form, asking for the context in which the case arose, identified
the following types of statutes: tax, workers' compensation, unemployment compensa-
tion, social security, Medicare, antidiscrimination, garnishment, usury, antitrust, patent,
maritime, securities, public utilities, corporate, condemnation, real property, foreign
subsidiaries, labor, estates, divorce, ERISA, environmental, bankruptcy, and liquor reg-
ulation. Constitutional issues and general government regulation were also identified.
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the question of piercing the corporate veil.62 As with any empirical
study, it is worthwhile to keep in mind what the study can and can-
not do. These results are based on reported cases that may not be a
representative sample: of all piercing the veil cases actually decided
(since many opinions are not reported); of all piercing the veil cases
actually filed (since most cases are settled); or of the total number of
transactions in which a "piercing" question comes up (since many
questions are resolved without litigation). 6 These limitations make
it inappropriate to draw conclusions as to the number of corpora-
tions in which the question of piercing the corporate veil arises. As
Richard Posner has written, one reading only veil piercing cases
would assume that the purpose of the corporate affiliation is to mis-
lead creditors. 64
The literature on selection bias (including the work by Priest
and Klein 65 and Priest alone66) suggests that disputes selected for
litigation will constitute neither a random nor representative sample
of the set of all disputes. Any relative comparison of various factors,
such as the one done here, can be affected to the extent that litigants
understand the prior learning on a legal issue and use that knowl-
edge to decide which cases to file, to continue on appeal, or to set-
tle.67 While that type of selection might be occurring in this set of
reported opinions, other factors suggest that the bias is not so great
as to prevent meaningful uses of differences in the results. First, as
the previous section discusses, the law in this area has not crystal-
lized. 68 Case results are very fact specific, and the fact patterns that
cause a court to pierce or not to pierce are not clearly understood.
The area of uncertainty is broad enough that litigants have contin-
ued to bring a large number of cases. Second, the lack of any signif-
icant change over time in the percentage of cases in which courts
62 In an additional article in progress, I use this data and a logit analysis, a form of
statistical regression analysis, to test the relationship between a dependent variable,
here the court's decision to pierce the veil, and independent variables here the various
factors recorded in the data set. Not surprisingly, the "conclusory" indicators of alter
ego and instrumentality are the factors most closely associated with a piercing result.
The explanation of that model and the results are left for another day.
63 A search of Lexis, as opposed to Westlaw, cases would produce a somewhat dif-
ferent universe, but probably not affect the results.
64 Posner, supra note 25, at 524.
65 George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1984) (developing a model that suggests "disputes selected for litiga-
tion (as opposed to settlement) will constitute neither a random nor a representative
sample of the set of all disputes").
66 George L. Priest, Selective Characteristics of Litigation, 9J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1980);
George L. Priest, Measuring Legal Change (1987) (Yale Law School working paper, Pro-
gram in Civil Liability).
67 For example, defendants who thought that undercapitalization leads to veil
piercing would be more inclined to settle those cases before trial.
68 See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 3-18.
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pierce the veil, or any significant difference between results in state
and federal court cases or between results in trial, appellate, and
supreme court cases, suggests that the sample has stayed within the
same broad range.69 Finally, to the extent that these results are
used to evaluate theories in prior commentary, this study uses a data
set broader than the sample of reported cases that form the basis for
the comments previously put forward.
IV
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
A. The Frequency Distributions
1. General Observations
Some initial observations can be made based on review of the
entire data set. Piercing of the corporate veil is limited to close cor-
porations and corporate groups (parent/subsidiary or sibling corpo-
rations).70 In the entire data set, piercing did not occur in a publicly
held corporation. 7' This universal respect for the separateness of
the corporate entity in publicly held corporations reflects the differ-
ent role that limited liability plays in larger corporations. All corpo-
rations can use the corporate form to allocate risk.72 Limited
liability performs the additional function in larger corporations of
facilitating the transferability of shares and making possible organ-
69 The results are given in Tables 2, 3, and 4. Except in Table 4, the data is not
broken down between trial and appellate courts. It is possible that there is an "af-
firmed" effect, a tendency of appellate courts to affirm the decisions of lower courts,
which the data as presented here does not reveal. For a more general discussion of this
possibility, see Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, What Shapes Perceptions of the
Federal Court System?, 56 U. Cm. L. REv. 501, 517-19 (1989).
70 As set out in Table 7, infra, the data set included 777 close corporation cases, 637
parent/subsidiary or sibling cases, and nine cases involving public corporations. Two or
more corporations controlled by the same person or entity are "sibling corporations."
71 In the nine public corporations cases included in the data set the court's decision
was not to pierce. Professor Blumberg lists Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349, reh'g
denied, 321 U.S. 804 (1944), as a possible exception to the generalization that courts do
not pierce the veils of publicly held corporations. Blumberg, supra note 15, at 289 n.11;
cf. Fors v. Farrell, 271 Mich. 358, 260 N.W. 886 (1935) (similar result under a compara-
ble Michigan statute). The Abbott Court held that shareholders of a bank holding com-
pany, who apparently numbered several thousand, were subject to the double liability
imposed by federal statute on bank shareholders, even though the bank holding com-
pany was the sole actual shareholder of the bank subject to the statute. The Court
sought to prevent evasion of the double assessment provisions of the Banking Act. This
case can be distinguished from many piercing cases because of the specific provisions of
the Banking Act which impose double liability on all shareholders. Abbott does not nec-
essarily support imposing liability on public shareholders in the absence of a statute.
Banking law no longer imposes double liability, so it is appropriate to characterize this
case as sui generis. Even so, Justice Douglas's broad language continues to be cited as
justification for piercing the veils of close corporations and parent/subsidiary
companies.
72 See supra text accompanying notes 24-26.
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ized securities markets with the increased liquidity and diversifica-
tion benefits that these markets make possible.73 The absence of
these market-related benefits for close corporations 74 explains, in
part, why courts are more willing to pierce the veil of close corpora-
tions, but a piercing result still requires a combination of other fac-
tors. The total absence of piercing in public corporations permits a
stronger positive statement for those corporations: the market-re-
lated benefits of limited liability are sufficient to prevail over all pos-
sible claims of those who have claims against the public corporation
and cannot collect from its assets.
A subsidiary corporation has sometimes been termed a special
variation of a one shareholder corporation, a view that would make
piercing entirely a close corporation doctrine. However, the data
illustrate that piercing cases in which the corporation's shareholders
are individuals differ in several ways from the cases in which the
shareholder is another corporation, so that there is value in describ-
ing piercing for close corporations separately from piercing within
corporate groups. 75
Courts pierced the veil in about 40% of reported cases.
TABLE ONE
Category All cases Pierce No Pierce % Piercing
1583 636 947 40.18
The remainder of this article examines factors which lead to pierc-
ing percentages different from the overall percentage shown in
Table 1. Before evaluating these factors consider first the factors
that do not appear to have any significant effect on the results:
- There is no trend over time. Courts do not appear to be
moving toward permitting piercing in more and more situations. 76
73 See Woodward, supra note 28, at 603 ("[l]imited liability [in publicly traded firms]
can be motivated solely by transaction and information costs" without the consideration
of risk aversion); see also Halpern, Trebilcock & Turnbull, supra note 28, at 130-31 (a
capital market would exist for unlimited liability firms among wealthy investors, but
there will not be a single price for all shares of a particular company).
74 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 5, at 109-10 (the authors note that close
corporations do not reap the other benefits of limited liability: facilitating efficient
riskbearing, facilitating monitoring by capital markets, less need for facilitating the take-
over market or diversification, and greater moral hazard problems).
75 For example, about two-thirds of the tort cases involve corporate shareholder
defendants. The piercing rate for those cases is lower than for cases in the data set. See
infra text accompanying notes 171-72.
76 Contra David H. Barber, Piercing the Corporate Veil, 17 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 371,
404 (1981) (courts moving slowly toward permitting piercing in more and more
situations).
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While there are variations from year to year, the percentage of cases
in which courts pierce the veil has stayed relatively constant over the
last several decades. 77
TABLE Two
Total number
Category of cases Pierce No Pierce % Piercing
Pre-1960 130 53 77 40.77
1960s 399 164 235 41.10
1970s 572 233 339 40.73
1980s 484 187 297 38.64
- State courts pierce the veil in about the same percentage of
cases as federal courts.78
TABLE THREE
Total number
Category of cases Pierce No Pierce % Piercing
State Courts 938 369 569 39.34
Federal Courts 647 268 379 41.42
- Trial, appellate, and supreme courts pierce in a similar per-
centage of cases. 79
77 Table 2 shows results from each of the last three decades. The differences be-
tween decades in Table 2 are not statistically significant. The statistical significance re-
fers to the degree of confidence we have in rejecting a particular null hypothesis. In this
paper the null hypothesis is usually some variation of the hypothesis that there is no
difference between piercing percentages from different groups of cases (e.g., those in
different time periods or those involving corporations with different numbers of share-
holders).
The significance level is the probability that a result as extreme as the one observed
could have occurred by chance. If the observed significance level is small enough, usu-
ally 0.05, the null hypothesis is rejected.
AZ test is used to measure the difference. AZ value greater than 1.96 indicates that
a result is significant at the 0.05 level. That is, in 95 times out of 100, the difference as
set forth in the data would not have occurred by chance. That threshold is used in this
paper for results described as statistically significant.
78 The difference is not statistically significant. These findings contradict earlier
suggestions that federal courts are more willing to pierce the corporate veil. See Note,
Piercing the Corporate VeiL" The Alter Ego Doctrine Under Federal Common Law, 95 HARV. L.
REv. 853, 870 (1982); see also Note, Piercing the Corporate Veil in Federal Courts: Is Circumven-
tion of a Statute Enough?, 13 PAc. LJ. 1245, 1255 (1982) (authored by PatriciaJ. Hartman)
(federal courts require a lesser burden of proof to disregard the corporate entity).




Category of cases Pierce No Pierce % Piercing
Trial Courts 401 161 240 40.15
Intermediate App. 860 338 522 39.30
Supreme Courts 316 133 183 42.09
- The identity of the plaintiff as either an individual or a cor-
poration leads to no differences in results.80
TABLE FIVE
Total number
Category of cases Pierce No Pierce 7o Piercing
Individual Plaintiff 695 262 433 37.70
Corporate Plaintiff 652 240 412 36.81
- Creditors and noncreditors have similar success rates in
cases they bring as plaintiffs.8 1
2. Differences by State
The percentage of cases in which courts pierce the veil varies
depending on which state's law is being applied. Among the eight
states with the most piercing decisions, the percentage of cases in
which courts pierced ranged from 31% in Pennsylvania and 35% in
New York to 45% in California. 2 Given the small number of cases
in each jurisdiction, the differences between the states are not statis-
tically significant. Therefore, it is not possible to say with certainty
80 Government plaintiffs were not classified as either individual or corporate and
had a piercing success rate of about 58%o. See infra Table 8.
81 See infra Table 8. "Creditors" was used here to include those persons who had a
bargain-type relationship with the corporation prior to the event that gave rise to the
piercing claim. The differences in Table 8 between government as plaintiff and credi-
tors as plaintiff and between corporations as plaintiff and creditors as plaintiff are statis-
tically significant.
82 See infra Table 6. The results from the states with the largest numbers of piercing
cases are as follows:
States Cases Percentage Pierced
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TABLE Six
"5tal number
Category O' >of cases Pierce No Pierce % Piercing
AK 10 3 7 30.00
AL 17 11 6 64.71
AR 23 9 14 39.13
AZ 17 7 10 41.18
CA 89 40 49 44.94
CO 13 7 6 53.85
GT 11 7 4 63.64
DC 10 6 4 60.00
DE 11 0 11 0.00
Federal 302 119 183 39.40
FL 46 19 27 41.30
GA 47 18 29 38.30
HA 4 1 3 25.00
IA 12 7 5 58.33
ID 9 6 3 66.67
IL 78 33 45 42.31
IN 16 11 5 68.75
KS 19 15 4 78.95
KY 15 4 11 26.67
LA 67 24 43 35.82
MA 15 6 9 40.00
MD 15 6 9 40.00
ME 8 2 6 25.00
MI 22 6 16 27.27
MN 13 5 8 38A6
MO 30 12 18 40.00
MS 14 5 9 35.71
MT 8 4 4 50.00
NC 21 9 12 42.86
ND 4 3 1 75.00
NE 12 7 5 58.33
NH 5 0 5 0.00
NJ 20 9 11 45.00
NM 13 2 11 15.38
NV 12 5 7 41.67
NY 212 74 138 34.91
OH 14 8 6 57.14
OK 15 6 9 40.00
OR 16 9 7 56.25
PA 65 20 45 30.77
PR 3 0 3 0.00
RI 6 2 4 33.33
SC 8 3 5 37.50
SD 8 5 3 62.50
TN 18 7 11 38.89
TX 106 37 69 34.91
UT 7 3 4 42.86
VA 16 4 12 25.00
VT 0 0 0 0
WA 27 12 15 44.44
WI 16 8 8 50.00
WV 7 3 4 42.86
WY 8 5 3 62.50
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that these results are due to different views of the law.83
The higher percentage of piercing in California cases may re-
flect that state's relative lateness in embracing the doctrine of lim-
ited liability. Until 1931, shareholders in California corporations
remained liable for at least some of a creditor's claim against the
corporation.8 4 Each shareholder was liable for the proportion of
each creditor's claim that corresponded to the shareholder's pro-
portional ownership in the stock of the corporation.8 5 This liability
expired three years after the date on which corporate liability was
incurred and was subject to other limitations.8 6 It is uncertain how
often this liability was asserted, but the statute probably contributed
to a perception that public policy in California favored piercing the
corporate veil.
New York, as this country's leading commercial center, has pro-
duced the most piercing cases. As a group, the New York decisions
seem somewhat more restrictive on piercing than cases from the rest
of the country.8 7 Delaware, clearly the most dominant state in cor-
porate law, has produced very few piercing cases.88 This result is
consistent with viewing piercing as a close corporation issue,8 9 since
Delaware's traditional focus has been on large corporations where
there is a separation of function between managers and share-
holders. 90 Using Delaware law, courts did not pierce in any of the
83 Again, "statistical significance" refers to the degree of confidence we have in
rejecting a null hypothesis that the difference in the results could not have occurred by
chance. See supra note 77. The Z test value for the difference between California and
New York, for example, was 1.66.
84 Under the California constitution and implementing statutes between 1849 and
1931, shareholders had a pro rata liability for all corporate obligations incurred while
they were shareholders. See 2 HAROLD MARSH, JR., MARSH'S CALIFORNIA CORPORATION
LAw § 15.13 (2d ed. 1986).
85 CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 36 (1849) (repealed 1879); id. art. XII, § 3 (1879) (re-
pealed 1930). An 1850 statute specified that each shareholder was liable only for the
proportion of a claim that corresponded to the shareholder's proportional ownership of
the corporation. Act of Apr. 22, 1850, ch. 128, § 32, 1850 Cal. Stat. 347, 350, amended by
Act of Apr. 27, 1863, ch. 518, § 1, 1863 Cal. Stat. 766, repealed by Act ofJune 12, 1931,
ch. 862, § 1, 1931 Cal. Stat. 1762. A 1929 statute authorized limited liability if "Lim-
ited" or "Ltd." was included in the corporate name. Act of May 23, 1929, ch. 418, § 1,
1929 Cal. Stat. 740. The constitutional provision providing for shareholder liability was
repealed in 1930, and the implementing statute was repealed in 1931. Act ofJune 12,
1931, ch. 862, § 1, 1931 Cal. Stat. 1762.
86 2 H. MARSH, supra note 84, § 15.13 at 330.
87 New York cases made up 13.39% of the data set. The percentage of cases in
which the courts pierced (34.91%) is less than the 40.1% for all cases, but this difference
is not statistically significant. See supra note 77.
88 In the data set, there were 11 cases decided on the basis of Delaware law.
89 See supra text accompanying notes 70-74.
90 More than half of all corporations listed on the New York Stock Exchange are
incorporated in Delaware, but Delaware cases make up less than 0.7% of the data set.
The lack of Delaware cases illustrates the focus on close corporations evident in the
piercing cases, and suggests that even for corporate groups, the issue occurs less fre-
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eleven reported cases. This fact may reflect the larger size of Dela-
ware corporations or a general leaning toward protecting corpora-
tions in that jurisdiction. 9 1
Knowledge of differences between states is useful only when
parties to the litigation can predict and choose which state law will
be applied. Potential defendants, who almost always are corporate
insiders, can choose the state of incorporation. 92 Those who have
chosen a restrictive piercing jurisdiction would argue that a court
should apply the "internal affairs" rule and apply the laws of the
state of incorporation to the piercing decision.93 The internal affairs
rule is a choice of law principle under which the laws of the state of
incorporation govern arrangements between shareholders and man-
agers.94 A few states, including New York and California, have as-
serted by statute their right to apply their own law to corporations
incorporated in other states.95 These statutes do not specifically list
piercing, which is a common-law doctrine in all states, but it seems
likely that a state which aggressively applied its corporations statute
would apply its common law in the same way.
Piercing the veil cases may not be governed by the internal af-
fairs rule even if that rule is applied to foreign corporations. The
dispute in a piercing case is not between shareholders and man-
agers, the traditional province of the internal affairs rule, but be-
tween the corporation's insiders and persons or entities who
contracted with the enterprise or who are connected to the enter-
quently in the largest American corporations. Of the few Delaware cases, most relate to
parent/subsidiary contexts. See, e.g., Pauley Petroleum, Inc. v. Continental Oil Co., 43
Del. Ch. 366, 231 A.2d 450 (1967), aff'd, 43 Del. Ch. 516, 239 A.2d 629 (1968); Buech-
ner v. Farbenfabriken Bayer Aktiengesellschaft, 38 Del. Ch. 490, 154 A.2d 684 (1959).
91 The only other jurisdictions with a lower piercing percentage were New Hamp-
shire (no piercing in five cases) and Puerto Rico (no piercing in three cases). There were
no Vermont cases.
92 The jurisdiction of incorporation is chosen in the first instance by the incorpora-
tor and can be changed thereafter by the directors and the shareholders. Creditors have
no direct influence on this choice.
93 The internal affairs rule refers to legal rules governing relations among share-
holders, officers, and directors, which are the major topics of state corporations codes.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 309 (1969).
94 See, e.g., MODEL BusINESS CORP. ACT § 15.05(c) (1984) ("This Act does not au-
thorize this state to regulate the organization or internal affairs of a foreign corporation
authorized to transact business in this state.").
95 See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115 (West 1991) (requiring corporations with cer-
tain minimum contacts to comply with several California provisions protecting share-
holders: cumulative voting, inspection, and dissenters' rights); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw §
1317 (McKinney 1991). The constitutionality of these statutes has not been resolved.
Compare Wilson v. Louisiana-Pacific Resources Inc., 138 Cal. App. 3d 216, 187 Cal. Rptr.
852 (1982) (upholding imposition of a California cumulative voting provision on a Utah
corporation doing business in California) with Arden-Mayfair, Inc. v. Louart Corp., 385
A.2d 3 (Del. Ch. 1978) (holding the California statute inapplicable under generally rec-
ognized choice of law principles).
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prise by tort or other laws. 96 The Restatement (Second) of the Conflict of
Laws suggests that the rule favoring the law of the state of incorpo-
ration extends to questions of liability to creditors. 97 Yet states
other than the state of incorporation have sometimes asserted the
right to apply their own statutes in order to protect their citizens
who are tort victims or creditors of out of state corporations. 98 Such
a connection with potential plaintiffs may give a non-incorporating
state a link to the transaction sufficient enough so that it can assert
the applicability of its laws. This can create uncertainty if multiple
states seek to apply differing rules of limited liability to the same
corporation. However, given the small number of piercing cases de-
cided in many jurisdictions and the similar results in many states,
this degree of uncertainty does not seem large.99
Knowledge of the differences between state approaches will
probably be of greater use to prospective plaintiffs, who, given a
choice, would rather file in a state whose results are more inclined to
piercing. Even if a forum state agrees to apply the law of the more
restrictive state of incorporation, the piercing law in all jurisdictions
leaves considerable room for judicial discretion; a plaintiff may pre-
fer this discretion to be exercised by a judge from a more friendly
"piercing" culture.
3. Diferences Based on the Number and Identity of the Shareholders
The number of shareholders makes a difference in the propen-
sity of courts to pierce the veil of corporations. Among close corpo-
rations, those with only one shareholder were pierced in almost
96 A Texas statute, enacted in 1989 after the Castleberry case, discussed supra note
40, states that the laws of the jurisdiction of incorporation of a foreign corporation shall
govern internal affairs and "the liability, if any, of shareholders of the foreign corpora-
tion for the debts, liabilities and obligations of the foreign corporation for which they
are not otherwise liable by statute or agreement." TEx. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 8.02
(Vernon 1991).
97 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLICT OF LAws § 307 (1969) ("The local law
of the state of incorporation will be applied to determine the existence and extent of a
shareholder's liability to the corporation for assessments or contributions and to its
creditors for corporate debts."). The comment to section 307 refers to exceptions for
actions deemed "penal or... contrary to a strong local public policy." Id. comment e at
329; see also TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 8.02 (Vernon 1991) (discussed supra note 96).
98 SeeJoncas v. Krueger, 61 Wis. 2d 529, 535, 213 N.W.2d 1, 4 (1973) (Wisconsin
statute imposing personal liability on corporate shareholders for unpaid wages due to
corporation's employees is applicable to foreign corporations. "We see no valid distinc-
tion.., why Wisconsin employees working in Wisconsin should be classified for benefits
depending upon where their employer is incorporated."). But see Armstrong v. Dyer,
268 N.Y. 671, 198 N.E. 551 (1935) (under similar New York statute, shareholders of a
foreign corporation are not liable).
99 See, e.g., Japan Petroleum Co. (Nigeria) v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 456 F. Supp. 831,




50% of the cases; for two or three shareholder corporations, the
percentage dropped to just over 46%, and for close corporations
with more than three shareholders, the percentage dropped to
about 35%. The differences between the one, two or three person
corporations, and the other close corporations are statistically
significant.' 00
TABLE SEVEN
Identity of Total number
Shareholders of cases Pierce No Pierce % Piercing
Individuals:
- One 276 137 139 49.64
- Two or
Three 238 110 128 46.22
Close but
- More
than Three 263 92 171 34.98
- Public
Shareholders 9 0 9 0.00
Total
Individuals 786 339 447 43.13
Corporate:
- Parent 386 142 244 36.79
- Subsidiary 68 19 49 27.94
- Sibling 183 76 107 41.53
Total Corporate 637 237 400 37.21
Since the 1897 decision of the House of Lords upholding the
limited liability of what was essentially a one person corporation,' 0 '
courts and commentators have vigorously debated the propriety of
limited liability for these enterprises.102 Lord Herschell in that case
asked, "[h]ow does it concern the creditor whether the capital... is
owned by seven persons.., or... almost entirely owned... by one
100 The Z test value for single shareholders versus close corporations with more
than three shareholders is 3.44. TheZ test value for two or three person corporations
versus larger close corporations is 2.50.
101 Salomon v. A. Salomon & Co., 1897 App. Cas. 22 (1896) (shares held in the
name of a leather merchant, his wife, and five children; after the company became insol-
vent, the House of Lords rejected the creditor's claim that the corporation was a sham).
102 See, e.g., Bernard F. Cataldo, Limited Liability with One-Man Companies and Subsidiary
Corporations, 18 LAw & Co 'EMP. PROBS. 473,475 (1953); Warner Fuller, The Incorporated
Individual: A Study of the One-Man Company, 51 HARV. L. REv. 1373, 1405 (1938); Note,
supra note 6, at 1089 (peculiar opportunity for manipulation and superior knowledge of
sole shareholder make it desirable that a sole shareholder claiming limited liability af-
firmatively show that corporation is adequately financed).
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person?" 10 3 The results show that the number of shareholders
seems to matter to judges. However, it is not, as some have sug-
gested, virtually impossible for one person corporations to retain
limited liability in any circumstance.10 4 Even though many of the
factors used by courts to justify piercing the veil are inescapable in
one person corporations, 10 5 these corporations still retain limited
liability in half of the reported cases.
The role that an individual plays within a corporation also has
an effect on the outcome. Defendants who served only as share-
holders were less likely to be successful targets of piercing suits than
shareholders who also served as directors or officers.' 0 6 Further, in
the few cases that characterized potential defendants as passive
shareholders rather than active in the business as directors, officers,
or otherwise, the courts almost always found no liability.10 7
4. Differences Based on Whether the Defendant is an Individual
or a Corporation
When potential defendants against whom liability is sought are
grouped as either individuals or corporations, courts pierce the veil
to get at individual defendants more often than they pierce to reach
corporations.108 This result is contrary to what some commentators
have suggested.' 0 9 However, if the one or the two or three person
corporations are excluded from this count, the courts pierce more
often to reach shareholders who are corporations. 10
Among potential corporate shareholders, courts are more in-
103 Salomon, 1897 App. Cas. at 44-45.
104 See, e.g., Note, Corporations-Shareholder Liability-Louisiana Adopts a Balancing Test
for Piercing the Corporate Veil, 58 TUL. L. REv. 1089, 1100 (1984) (authored by Patricia A.
Carteaux) (language in early cases seems to render retention of limited liability in a one
man corporation nearly impossible).
105 For example, many of the overlap factors are inevitable in a one person
corporation.
106 When the targets of piercing were described as shareholders, courts pierced in
41.51% of the cases (203 of 489). When the targets of piercing were described as both
shareholders and officers or directors, the percentage of piercing cases moved to
46.36% (140 of 302).
107 Courts refused to pierce in five of the six cases in the data set that were directed
at passive shareholders.
108 When potential targets of piercing were individuals, courts pierced in 43.13% of
the cases (339 of 786). Piercing was the outcome in 37.21% of cases where the target
was another corporation (237 of 637). See supra Table 7.
109 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 5, at 110-11; Krendl & Krendl, supra note 16, at
42 (parent-subsidiary relationship will be more closely scrutinized and may be more
readily susceptible to veil-piercing than corporations with individual shareholders). But
see Note, Inadequately Capitalized Subsidiaries, 19 U. Cni. L. REv. 872 n.1 (1952) (in the case
of corporations with inadequate capitalization, "liability appears to be more frequently
limited when the stockholder is not a corporate entity").
110 See supra Table 7 for the data on one shareholder and two or three shareholder
corporations. The percentage for remaining close corporations, 34.98% (92 of 263
1056 [Vol. 76:1036
1991] PIERCING THE VEIL 1057
dined to pierce when the potential liability is directed at sibling cor-
porations, and less inclined to pierce when a plaintiff seeks to look
through a parent to get to a subsidiary.'11
5. Diferences Based on the Identity of the Plaintiff
Although the identity of the potential defendant as either an
individual or a corporation did contribute to differences in result, "12
the identity of the plaintiff as either an individual or a corporation
did not have an impact. 13 The most successful plaintiffs were
governmental entities, and the least successful were the corpora-




Category of cases Pierce No Pierce 7o Piercing
Creditor
Plaintiff 612 259 353 42.32
Noncreditor
Plaintiff 514 207 307 40.27
Government
Plaintiff 218 126 92 57.80
Corporate
(self)
Plaintiff 164 22 142 13.41
Shareholder
Plaintiff 59 15 44 25.42
The differences between the government or corporate plaintiffs
and the creditor plaintiffs are statistically significant. 114 The govern-
ment's success often comes in the context of a statutory policy, as
opposed to a contract or tort context.
The corporation itself seldom is successful in arguing self-pierc-
cases), is less than the 37.21% piercing result where the shareholders are corporations.
This difference is not statistically significant.
111 See supra Table 7. When the piercing was directed through a parent to get at a
subsidiary, courts pierced in only 19 of 68 cases (27.94%). In the more common case
where litigants sought to reach through the subsidiary to get to the parent, the courts
pierced in 142 of 386 cases (36.79%), still a lower rate than in the sibling situation
(41.53%).
112 See the results described in Table 7 supra.
113 See the results described in Table 5 supra.
114 TheZ test value for the government as plaintiff compared to creditors as plaintiff
is 4.12. The Z test value for the corporation as plaintiff as compared to creditors as
plaintiffs is 6.83. For an explanation of Z values, see supra note 77.
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ing. Courts tell participants that they chose the form of the enter-
prise and that they are stuck with it in bad times as well as in
good.' 15 Yet the willingness of courts to pierce the veil in one out
of every eight of these cases shows the contextual nature of the cor-
porate form. The form is preserved in some situations but not
others, and judicial decisions are required to determine the appro-
priate contexts for preservation.
6. Differences Based on the Substantive Context in Which
the Claim Arose
When the cases are broken down based upon whether they
arose in a contract situation or a tort situation, the results show that
courts pierce more often in the contract context than in tort context.
This difference is statistically significant.1 16
TABLE NINE
Total
Context Cases Pierce No Pierce % Piercing
Contract 779 327 452 41.98
Tort 226 70 156 30.97
Criminal 15 10 5 66.67
Statute 552 224 328 40.58
When the question is asked a slightly different way-did the transac-
tion that was the subject of the piercing result from voluntary con-
tact or involuntary contact?-the results are similar to those
obtained in contract and tort cases, respectively." 17
These results, more than any other in the project, go against
the conventional wisdom. 118 Many commentators have noted that
115 See Note, Reverse Piercing the Corporate Veil: Should Corporation Owners Have It Both
Ways, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 667, 668 (1989) (authored by Michael J. Gaertner).
116 The Z test value is 2.98. A contract situation was defined to include piercing
cases arising out of bargain situations in which the plaintiff entered into an individual
transaction with the corporation.
117 For voluntary contact, courts pierced in 479 of 1142 cases (41.94%). For cases
with no voluntary contact, courts pierced in 133 of 379 cases (35.09%). These results
include more cases than the contract and tort categories in Table 9 because the volun-
tary/involuntary categories picked up cases that arose out of various statutory contexts.
Some of these cases arose from voluntary transactions between the parties (e.g., a bank-
ruptcy setting in which a creditor is seeking to pierce the veil) and some arose from
situations in which the parties had no voluntary contact (e.g., criminal law or other regu-
latory law).
118 They also are counter to Alexander Frey's early study on individual liability for
defective incorporation. That study found greater liability for individuals in situations
where the plaintiff had not dealt with the entity as a corporation than those cases in
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tort claimants have a better claim to piercing the veil because they
did not choose to deal with the corporate enterprise that ultimately
was unable to pay its obligation."19 In contrast, a contract claimant
voluntarily dealt with the corporate entity, had a greater opportu-
nity to evaluate the credit risks, and could have chosen not to deal
with the corporation. According to this reasoning, courts should
pierce more readily in tort settings.' 20 The next part of this Article
examines several factors in an attempt to explain the variance of
these results from conventional expectations. As the next part illus-
trates, a large segment of the contract cases, but not the tort cases,
arise in situations where the court is concerned with possible mis-
representation, and courts pierce the veil in almost all cases in which
they find misrepresentation.' 2' But even if misrepresentation cases
are deleted from the contract and tort cases, courts still pierce more
often in contract than in tort.
7. Diferences Based on Procedure
Jurisdiction and other procedural cases raise different issues
than the more ordinary contract and tort questions in veil piercing
jurisprudence. For example, in Cannon Manufacturing Co. v. Cudahy
Packing Co.,' 2 2 a North Carolina plaintiff sued a parent corporation
in North Carolina on the basis of the North Carolina activity of a
which the dealings were on a corporate basis. Alexander Hamilton Frey, Legal Analysis
and the "De Facto" Doctrine, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 1153, 1174 (1952).
119 See, e.g., Krendl & Krendl, supra note 16, at 34; Landers, supra note 4, at 623
(creditors better able to protect themselves). This distinction between contract and tort
creditors is not recent. See William 0. Douglas & Carrol M. Shanks, Insulation from Liabil-
ity Through Subsidiary Corporations, 39 YALE LJ. 193, 210-11 (1929) (notid'ng difference
between contract and tort settings).
120 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 5, at 112 (rationale for greater willingness to
pierce in torts than contracts follows directly from the economics of moral hazard; where
corporations don't have to pay for the risk, they are more likely to engage in activities
where social costs exceed social benefit).
Other commentators have noted that results did not seem to fit with theory. See
Barber, supra note 76, at 381 (one might expect different treatment for contract and tort
but most courts mechanically apply the same test to both situations); G. Michael Epper-
son & Joan M. Canny, The Capital Shareholder's Ultimate Calamity: Pierced Corporate Veils and
Shareholder Liability in the District of Columbia, Maryland, and Virginia, 37 CATr-. U.L. REV.
605, 633 (1988) (despite extensive scholarship on this point, most courts have failed to
distinguish between tort and contract); Hamilton, supra note 6, at 984-85, (astonishing
to find that this fundamental distinction is only dimly perceived by many courts).
121 Misrepresentation in this context refers to conduct that usually is something less
than would be required to recover under the common-law action of deceit. See supra
note 53. For purposes of this study, misrepresentations that occurred in a bargain rela-
tionship were included in the contract category, since the primary purpose of the con-
tract/tort division was to distinguish those transactions in which the parties had a
preexisting relationship from those in which they did not.
122 267 U.S. 333 (1925). Professor Blumberg suggests: "The star of Cannon is un-
mistakably on the wane." P. BLUMBERG, supra note 3, at 47.
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wholly-owned subsidiary. The United States Supreme Court con-
cluded that the subsidiary was a separate and distinct corporate en-
tity and that jurisdiction over the parent was lacking. In contrast,
later courts have been more willing to find jurisdiction; for example,
the California Supreme Court found jurisdiction in Empire Steel Corp.
v. Superior Court,123 holding that a parent was doing business in Cali-
fornia by reason of its interrelationship with its subsidiary.
An early article by Professors Douglas and Shanks noted the
different context of the jurisdiction cases and dismissed them from
further discussion. 124 More recently, Professor Blumberg has em-
phasized the different concerns in procedural cases: fairness and
convenience to the parties, federalism concerns, and an entity's rea-
sonable expectations of being called into court in a forum where it
derives income from its affiliates' business. 12 5 In the procedural
area, Blumberg sees enterprise law and a focus on corporate groups
as replacing the entity concept and the concern for limited liabil-
ity. 126 Other commentators and courts have suggested that a more
lenient standard applies in deciding whether to pierce the veil in
order to establish jurisdiction, than in deciding whether the links are
sufficient to make the shareholders liable for corporate debts. 127
The results in this study do not reflect a greater inclination to pierce
when the question is procedural, although there is a higher percent-
age of piercing in venue cases.
TABLE TEN
Procedure Total Cases I Pierce I No Pierce I 7 Piercine
Jurisdiction 141 52 89 36.88
Venue 12 7 5 58.33
8. Differences Based on Statutory Claims
Piercing the corporate veil is no longer limited to the common-
law contexts of contract and tort. Reflecting the increasing regula-
tory bent of our society, courts have been asked to disregard the veil
123 56 Cal. 2d 823, 366 P.2d 502, 17 Cal. Rptr. 150 (1961).
124 Douglas & Shanks, supra note 119, at 204.
125 P. BLUMBERG, supra note 3, at 461.
126 Id.
127 See Comprehensive Sports Planning, Inc. v. Pleasant Valley Country Club, 73
Misc. 2d 477, 341 N.Y.S.2d 914 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1973) (standard for piercing varies with
purpose, and standard for establishing jurisdiction is less strict than standard for finding
shareholder liability); cf Charles I. Wellborn, Subsidiary Corporations in New York: When is
Mere Ownership Enough to Establish Jurisdiction Over the Parent, 22 BUFFALO L. REv. 681, 685-




in a variety of statutory contexts. These cases dearly show the con-
textual nature of the piercing the veil question; courts look to the
specific context more than any inherent corporate characteristic to
determine if the separateness of the corporate form should be
respected. Of the 552 cases that raised the piercing question in a
statutory context, courts disregarded the separate entity about 40%o
of the time, 128 the same rate as in the overall study. However, there
are large disparities depending on the various statutes. For exam-
ple, in cases involving tax law, courts pierced the veil in only 31%o of
the cases. 129 The federal income tax, like most federal and state tax
codes, presumes that the corporation is a taxable entity separate
from its shareholders, creating the possibility of double taxation on
the income from the enterprise. The corporation is first taxed on its
income, and a separate tax is also levied on dividends paid to share-
holders by the corporation from the corporation's already taxed in-
come.'8 0 Courts are apparently less inclined to look behind the
separate entity in tax contexts.
Workers' compensation is another area where courts are less
inclined to pierce, doing so in less than 13%o of the cases.' 8 ' These
cases often involve the issue of whether an injured worker can bring
a civil action against a parent or other company related to the
worker's employer, in spite of workers' compensation statutes that
impose liability without fault as the employee's sole remedy against
the employer. Defendant parent corporations often seek to pierce
the veil to block a plaintiff's separate suit for recovery against the
parent and leave the plaintiff covered only by workers' compensa-
tion from the subsidiary.'8 2 Courts' disinclination to pierce the veil
usually permits these claims to continue, apparently putting concern
for recovery over any corporate law concerns. 183
At the other end of the spectrum, courts are more inclined to
pierce in environmental casesi34 and other areas where there is a
128 Courts pierced in 224 of 552 cases (40.58%). The different statutory categories
are listed infra note 135.
129 When the dispute was based on tax law (federal, state, income, estate, etc.),
courts pierced in 41 of 133 cases (30.83%o). See infra note 135.
130 Of course, there are ways to avoid double taxation, spch as electing subchapter S
status or zeroing out corporate income.
131 Courts pierced in only 5 of 39 cases (12.827) involving workers' compensation.
See infra note 135.
132 In effect, corporate defendants claim a form of self-piercing, asking the trier of
fact to consider the corporation and its shareholder as one employer, which blocks the
civil claim against both. See PHILIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS SUB-
sTANTivE LAw 327-38 (1987).
13 The failure to pierce is probably encouraged by the general judicial reluctance to
let corporations argue self-piercing. See, e.g., Boggs v. Blue Diamond Coal, 590 F.2d 655
(6th Cir.), cert. denied 444 U.S. 836 (1979).
134 This conclusion is muted because there are only a few cases in the data set (six).
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strong regulatory purpose,13 5 including a specific effort to reach re-
lated companies or individuals who control companies.
The importance of statutory policy is reflected in less use of
such traditional piercing factors as undercapitalization, informali-
ties, and misrepresentation in statutory cases as compared to con-
tract cases. Undercapitalization is present in more than 18%o of
contract cases in which the courts pierced the veil but is only present
in 8% of the statutory cases.'8 6 Similarly, the rate at which infor-
malities and misrepresentation appear in contract cases is nearly
double the rate at which these factors appear in statutory cases.'
37
Some environmental laws make corporate participants personally liable for actions they
take or fail to take on behalf of the corporation. See, e.g., Comprehensive Environmental
Response Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675
(1988), which imposes liability on owners or operators of certain polluting facilities. In
light of this statutory policy, it is not surprising to see a higher piercing percentage in
environmental cases.











Public Utilities 6/5 54.55
Labor 16/14 53.33











Social Security 1/3 25.00
Real Property 3/12 20.00
Foreign Subsidiary 1/4 20.00
Condemnation 2/10 16.67
Workers Comp. 5/34 12.82
FELA 0/4 0
Constitution 0/2 0
136 Undercapitalization was present in 61 of the 327 contract cases in which the
court pierced the veil (18.65%). Courts cited undercapitalization in only 18 of the 224
statutory cases in which they pierced (8.04%).
137 Informalities were cited in 67 of 327 contract cases in which the court pierced
(20.49%) as compared to 25 of 224 statutory cases (11.16%). Misrepresentation was
cited in 98 of the 327 contract cases (29.97%) and 39 of the 224 statutory cases
(17.41%).
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B. Reasons Given by the Courts
The seeming indeterminacy of veil-piercing law reflects not just
the conclusory language frequently used by the courts but also the
broad range of reasons proffered when the courts attempt to explain
their conclusions. As one commentator has noted, the same reasons
seem to appear in cases which pierce the veil and those decisions
which do not.1 38 The next section presents the empirical results of
the reasons given by the courts, focusing both on the relative fre-
quency with which these reasons appear in piercing cases and the
percentage of times that the appearance of these reasons coincides
with a piercing result. Subsequent sections analyze in more detail
two substantive areas often discussed in connection with piercing:
undercapitalization and informalities.
TABLE ELEVEN
Number of Cases Number of
in which factor Number of Piercing No-Piercing Percentage
Category mentioned Results Results Pierced
Instrumentality 75 73 2 97.33
Alter Ego 181 173 8 95.58
Misrepresentation 169 159 10 94.08
Agency 52 48 4 92.31
Dummy 78 70 8 89.74
Lack of
Substantive
Separation 141 120 21 85.11
Intertwining 63 54 9 85.71
Undercapitalization 120 88 32 73.33
Informalities 151 101 50 66.89
Domination
& Control 551 314 237 56.99
Overlap:
Officers 174 87 87 50.00
Directors 152 66 86 43.42
Owners 101 49 52 48.51
Office 68 40 28 58.82
Business Activity 43 35 8 81.40
Employees 52 36 16 69.23
Managment 43 28 15 65.12
Other 169 118 51 69.82
Total Overlap 812 459 343 56.53
138 Comment, Disregarding the Corporate Entity: Contract Claims, 28 OHIO ST. LJ. 441,
441 (1967).
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1. The Frequency Distribution
The factors most often associated with an affirmative result in a
piercing case were not necessarily those that appeared the most
often. The group of factors most associated with successful piercing
(with the empirical results given in parentheses) included several of
the traditional conclusory factors: "instrumentality" (97.33%), "al-
ter ego" (95.58%), and "dummy" (89.74%). Also in this most suc-
cessful category were cases involving misrepresentation, present in
169 cases and leading to a piercing result 159 times (94%). If a
court found intertwining or lack of substantive separation, it pierced
the veil more than 85% of the time.
Factors leading less often to a piercing result were under-
capitalization (73%) and failure to follow corporate formalities
(67%).139 Still further down the success ladder were judicial cita-
tions to domination and control (57%) and overlap of various sorts
between the corporation and the shareholder (57%). Within this
group, courts placed different importance on various kinds of over-
lap. Where common business activities were cited, the courts
pierced 81% of the time; for common employees, 69% of the time;
and for common management, 65% of the time. Other commonali-
ties were less often associated with piercing. Courts pierced only
59% of the time when they listed common offices and only half of
the time for common officers. Even less important were common
directors (courts pierced only 43% of the time when this factor was
mentioned) and common owners (49%). These results suggest that
courts are looking beyond the formal overlap of shareholders, direc-
tors, and officers to see if businesses show other signs of intertwin-
ing between the corporation and the shareholder.
The survey form, used to collect information for each case in
the data set, also listed factors whose absence was mentioned by the
court.140 Courts refused to pierce the veil in at least 92% of the
cases in which a factor's absence was noted, and sometimes up to
100% of those cases. Misrepresentation emerges as the factor
whose absence was most often noted by the courts. 141 Courts cited
the absence of misrepresentation in 391 cases, almost one-quarter
of the cases, and more than twice the number of cases in which the
139 These categories are indirectly characterized supra notes 50 and 51.
140 Since the piercing tests used by courts tend to include many factors, courts often
mention factors that lead to piercing which are not present in a particular case. The
factors tabulated are the same ones listed infra note 141.
141 The total number of cases in which the absence of a particular factor was noted
by the court and the outcome of those cases are:
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presence of misrepresentation is mentioned.' 42 The absence of
overlap of management and other corporate relations is mentioned
more than 300 times, as compared to more than 800 cases in which
the presence of such an overlap is mentioned. 43
2. Undercapitalization
Undercapitalization is a factor frequently cited by commenta-
tors as part of a normative standard in piercing cases. Ballantine
said in the 1940s, "[i]t is coming to be recognized as the policy of
the law that shareholders should in good faith put at the risk of the
business unincumbered capital reasonably adequate for its prospec-
tive liabilities."' 44 Other commentators have gone so far as to con-
clude that undercapitalization is present in every piercing case 145 or
that every undercapitalization case should lead to piercing. 46 Sev-
eral commentators see undercapitalization as particularly important
in tort cases as compared to contract cases,' 47 or as interacting with
other factors such as misrepresentation to enhance the likelihood of
piercing. 48 The results of undercapitalization cases are surprising
Percentage
Absent Factor Mentioned Pierce/No Pierce Not Pierced
Misrepresentation 30/361 92.33
Overlap (all factors) 24/285 92.23
Alter Ego 1/165 99.40
Domination & Control 2/124 98.41
Lack of Substantive Separation 1/99 99.00
Informalities 4/71 94.67





142 Misrepresentation was noted as present in 169 cases. When courts mentioned
the absence of misrepresentation in 391 cases, they went on to pierce in only 30. When
courts observed the presence of misrepresentation, they went on to pierce just over 94%0
of the time (159 of 169 cases). See supra Table 11.
143 Courts mentioned the absence of overlap between corporation and shareholders
in 309 cases and pierced in 24. Courts observed the presence of overlap in 822 cases,
and pierced in 469 (57.06%). See supra Table 11.
144 HENRY WINTHROP BALLANTINE, BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS 303 (rev. ed.
1946).
145 Berle, supra note 12, at 349 n.15 ("In all cases insufficient capitalization is per-
suasive evidence that the enterprise was not separate").
146 Rutheford B. Campbell, Limited Liability For Corporate Shareholders: Myth Or Matter-
Of-Fact, 63 Ky. Lj. 23, 53 (1975).
147 Berle, supra note 12, at 352-53; Hamilton, supra note 6, at 988; Note, Inadequate
Capitalization As A Basis For Shareholder Liability: The California Approach And A Recommenda-
tion, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 823, 836 (1972) (authored by Robert E. Dye).
148 Hackney & Benson, supra note 7, at 865 ("[A]ny element of misrepresentation,
express or implied, coupled with undercapitalization, will warrant imposition of...
liability").
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in light of this commentary; these expectations are not reflected in
the results. Of 327 contract cases in which courts pierced the veil,
undercapitalization is present only in sixty-one (about 19%); of sev-
enty tort cases in which courts pierced the veil, undercapitalization
is present in only nine (just under 13%). A piercing result was
somewhat more likely in the tort cases in which undercapitalization
was present (75%) than in contract cases (70%), but the small
number of tort cases in which undercapitalization is mentioned de-
creases the impact of this difference. 149 In both contexts, courts
refused to pierce in 25 to 30% of the cases even when undercapital-
ization was present, belying any automatic predictive value for that
factor.
Undercapitalization was mentioned in only 8% of the statutory
cases, which is somewhat less than the percentage for tort cases, and
less than half of the contract case percentage. The court pierced in
82%150 of these statutory cases, more than for either torts or con-
tract cases.151
The presence of undercapitalization was noted in about the
same percentage of successful piercing cases involving close corpo-
rations, parent-subsidiary corporations, and sibling corporations
(between 10% and 12%).152 Its presence was noted in a larger per-
centage of sole shareholder cases (14.5%) and in a much larger
number of cases involving two or three shareholders. Undercapital-
ization appeared in over 24% of two- or three-shareholder cases in
which the courts pierced the veil.' 53 Yet, overall, undercapitaliza-
tion appears in a small minority of the cases. 15 4
Undercapitalization and fraud in the same setting do not ex-
plain a large number of cases. Of 636 cases in which courts pierced
the veil, either undercapitalization or misrepresentation was present
149 Undercapitalization was present in 12 torts cases; in nine, courts pierced the veil
(75.00%). Undercapitalization was present in 87 contracts cases; in 61, courts pierced
the veil (70.11 %). The difference is not statistically significant.
150 Piercing occurred in 18 of 22 cases.
151 See the results described supra text accompanying note 149.
152 See infra note 154.
153 See id.
154 When piercing the veil, courts cited undercapitalization as follows:
Percentage
of Piercing
Number of Cases Number of Cases that
Number of When Piercing Cases Cited
Shareholders Court Pierced Citing Undercap Undercap
One 137 20 14.60
Two or Three 110 27 24.55
Close 92 11 11.96
Parent/Sub 162 18 11.11
Sibling 76 8 10.53
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in 222 (about 35%), but both were listed as present in only 25. Mis-
representation was present in slightly over 28% of the undercapital-
ization cases in which the court pierced (twenty-five of eighty-eight).
Undercapitalization was present in just under 16% of the misrepre-
sentation cases in which the court pierced (25 of 159). These results
indicate that misrepresentation has some predictive value in under-
capitalization cases, but still more than 70% of the successful under-
capitalization cases do not mention misrepresentation.
As cited in the last section, undercapitalization is not among the
factors most frequently cited by the courts in piercing the veil, 155
nor is it among the factors associated with the greatest likelihood
of piercing. 156 The relative infrequency with which courts cite un-
dercapitalization in tort-related piercing cases suggests it is an issue
that appeals to commentators for reasons other than its predictive
significance.
3. Informalities
Judicial reliance on a corporation's failure to follow corporate
formalities as a basis for piercing the veil has been criticized as the-
oretically unsound. 157 Other commentators note that courts nearly
always cite disregard of formalities, and that failure to maintain for-
malities substantially increases the probability of piercing.' 58 Again
the results do not provide confirmation for the commentary. Of 151
cases in which courts cited a corporation's failure to follow corpo-
rate formalities, courts pierced the veil in 101 (just under 67%).
That percentage of piercing is a little less than the percentage for
undercapitalization, and is well below the results in several other
categories where the success rate for piercing was in the 85% to
95% range. 159
Informalities are cited in 20% of the contract cases in which
courts pierced, as compared to about 11% of the tort and statutory
cases in which courts pierced.' 60 That difference between contract
155 See supra Table 11.
156 Id
157 E.g., Krendl & Krendl, supra note 16, at 28 n.98 (noting that most states do not
penalize a corporation for non-compliance with procedural formalities, and further not-
ing that while a failure to follow formalities may indicate that the corporation is an in-
strumentality and may be misleading, the misrepresentation issue adequately addresses
these concerns).
158 Barber, supra note 76, at 377; Campbell, supra note 146, at 45; Epperson &
Canny, supra note 120, at 641.
159 See results described supra Table 11.
160 See the results described supra note 137. Informalities were present in 8 of the
70 (11.437) tort cases in which courts pierced the veil.
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and tort is similar to the results for undercapitalization. 16 1 How-
ever, unlike undercapitalization, the outcome varied among the
three categories of cases. The courts pierced in 61%o of the contract
cases with informalities (as compared to 70%o for undercapitaliza-
tion); 53% of the tort cases with informalities (compared to 75% for
tort cases with undercapitalization); and 40% of the statutory cases
with informalities (compared to 82%o' for statutory cases with under-
capitalization). 162 Thus, the factor of corporate informalities is
more important for contract cases than for other cases, both in the
number of times it is used and its likelihood of coinciding with a
piercing result. There is some connection between informalities
and misrepresentation; 163 of 101 cases in which the court pierced
and cited informalities, twenty-four also mentioned misrepre-
sentation.
4. Contract versus Tort
Most commentators separate contracts from tort, arguing that a
tort context presents an entirely separate problem from contract in
piercing the corporate veil, and suggesting that courts should be
much more willing to disregard the corporate entity and reach the
shareholders when a tort has been committed. 164 Commentators
cite a moral hazard problem: insiders in a limited liability corpora-
tion can transfer costs of accidents to those who deal with the corpo-
ration.165 Surprisingly, in light of these theories, the results of the
cases show a smaller percentage of tort cases than contract cases in
which the court pierced the veil. 166
The relative absence of tort cases in piercing jurisprudence
(only 226 as compared to almost 800 contract cases) suggests that
piercing law is rooted in concerns of inequitable bargains. The re-
sults seem to confirm Robert Clark's point that the most recurring
problems in the piercing area are fraudulent transfers and similar
161 See the results described supra note 136. Undercapitalization was present in 9 of
the 70 tort cases in which the court pierced (12.86%o).
162 Of 109 contract cases where informalities were present, the courts pierced in 67
(61.47%o). Of 15 tort cases with informalities, the courts pierced in 8 (53.33%0). Of 62
statutory cases involving informalities, the courts pierced in 25 (40.32%o). The compara-
ble results for undercapitalization are found supra text accompanying notes 149 and 151.
163 See Krendl & Krendl, supra note 16, at 31-34.
164 See supra text accompanying notes 118-20.
165 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 5, at 112.
166 See supra Table 9. Some commentators have noted the lower percentages for
piercing in the tort context. See Epperson & Canny, supra note 120, at 633 (despite
extensive scholarship that tort plaintiffs should be preferred, the consistent outcome in
Maryland and the District of Columbia has been to prefer the contract plaintiff more
than the tort plaintiff).
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contract-related claims.' 6 7 However, even if we eliminate the mis-
representation cases from the contracts group, the piercing results
still remain higher in contract cases.' 68 Courts pierced in about
34% of the nonmisrepresentation contract cases as opposed to 27%
of the nonmisrepresentation tort cases.' 69 Undercapitalization,
which many commentators believe should cut more strongly in favor
of piercing the veil in tort, 170 can explain only a small portion of the
tort cases. Courts pierced in nine of the twelve (75%o) tort cases in
which undercapitalization was cited as compared to sixty-one of
eighty-seven contract cases (slightly more than 70%o) in which un-
dercapitalization was mentioned by the court. The impact of this
small difference is reduced by the fact that the undercapitalization
factor is less often cited in tort than in contract cases. Overall, tort
settings seem to involve different concerns than contracts cases.
The lower percentage of piercing in tort cases is interesting be-
cause more than two-thirds of the tort cases involve corporate
defendants (either a sibling, parent, or subsidiary).' 71 This combi-
nation of a corporate deep pocket and a nonvoluntary claimant sug-
gests that the plaintiff would have a greater chance of success.' 72
Yet courts pierce the veil in less than one quarter of the parent-
subsidiary cases where the plaintiff alleged a tort claim. There may
be some selection bias in this area or the parties may have different
stakes in the outcome. 173 The change in product-liability law and
tort law generally in recent decades may have led plaintiffs to bring
suits that go beyond prior law.174 Additionally, the large number of
167 Robert Charles Clark, The Duties of the Corporate Debtor to Its Creditors, 90 HARv. L.
REV. 505, 542 n.98 (1977).
168 Misrepresentation can be treated as a tort. Although, in the piercing area, the
misrepresentation referred to by courts does not rise to the level required for the tradi-
tional tort of deceit. See supra note 121. In this study, the contract category included
transactions arising from a bargain setting; not surprisingly, almost all misrepresenta-
tion cases occurred in this setting.
169 In the contracts area, courts pierced in 327 of 779 cases (41.98%). See supra
Table 9. Misrepresentation was cited by the court in 107 of those cases (98 in which the
court pierced and 9 in which the court did not pierce). If those misrepresentation cases
are subtracted from the contract group, the court pierced in 229 of 672 cases (34.08%),
a percentage still higher than that of the tort results when misrepresentation cases are
omitted (58 of 213) (27.23%).
170 See authorities cited supra note 147.
171 For tort cases, 149 of 205 (72.68%) involved corporations as targeted sharehold-
ers and 56 involved individuals (27.32%). The corporate/individual identity was not
determined in the remaining 21 tort cases. In the overall set, excluding cases in which
the corporate status of the defendant was not determined, 45% of the cases were di-
rected at corporate defendants and 55% were targeted at individuals.
172 See authorities cited supra notes 119 and 120.
173 See Priest & Klein, supra note 65, at 40.
174 Cf James A. Henderson & Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in Products
Liability: An Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L. REV. 479, 483-85 (1990) (noting
that the fall of the citadel of privity in the 1960s was followed by the fall of other barriers
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corporate defendants may mean that they have more to lose than
plaintiffs have to gain, pushing the results in the direction of less
piercing. Undercapitalization and informalities are seldom men-
tioned in these cases.
V
CONCLUSION
Piercing the corporate veil raises the issue of whether the risks
of an enterprise can be shifted to parties outside the corporation.
The usual corporate law rule of limited liability means that when a
corporation is introduced into a transaction, some of the risk in the
transaction passes to outside parties. If the corporation's assets are
insufficient to pay its debts, creditors, not shareholders, are left
exposed.
This rule is not mandatory. Parties are free to change it by pro-
viding for individual liability of shareholders. Even if the parties
have not changed this rule, a court might accomplish the same re-
sult by piercing the corporate veil. Courts essentially treat the rule
of limited liability as a presumption that can be rebutted by suffi-
cient facts. The hundreds of cases in which courts have pierced the
corporate veil tell us that this presumption can be rebutted. Yet the
various factors and lists in cases and commentary create more con-
fusion than clarity as to when disregard of the corporate entity is
appropriate. The empirical analysis described in this article
removes some of the mist and metaphor by illustrating when the
presumption of limited liability holds and when it does not.
First, piercing the corporate veil is a doctrine exclusively
directed at close corporations and corporate groups. The total ab-
sence of piercing in publicly held corporations indicates the pres-
ence of factors in the public corporation setting that make the
presumption of limited liability unassailable. It is not that risk can-
not be shifted to nonconsenting outsiders by the use of the corpo-
rate form, for surely this occurs in public corporations. Nor is the
law unwilling to permit passive investors to suffer because of the
actions of their managers who act in the name of the entity. The
value of shareholders' investments in public corporations declines
when civil or criminal liability is assessed against the enterprise be-
cause of the acts of officers and other employees. The willingness to
sometimes hold shareholders of close corporations liable, but never
shareholders of public corporations, suggests that limited liability's
to recovery such as the patent danger rule and the bystander rule as courts extended the
boundaries of products liability, and concluding that plaintiffs challenging traditional
barriers "met with enough success to create the reasonable expectation that it was just a
matter of time before those citadels fell in turn.").
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positive role in facilitating the public market for shares is strong
enough to overcome any justification for piercing.
Second, the data suggests that for close corporations, piercing
the corporate veil is strongly rooted in the bargain setting. Because
the market-related reasons for limited liability are absent in close
corporations and corporate groups, the most important justification
for limited liability is permitting parties in a consensual relationship
to use the corporate form to allocate the risks of the transaction and
the enterprise. Thus the presumption of limited liability is strongest
when the outside party adversely affected by the corporation's lim-
ited assets was aware of the corporation's separate existence at the
time of the transaction. Conversely, courts will disregard limited li-
ability for the same reasons that other bargains are not respected by
courts. For example, misrepresentation is one of the most frequent
factors listed by courts when they pierce the veil.
The principle of limited liability covers more than explicit bar-
gains; it is more than a default rule that simply saves the parties the
costs of writing the rule to shift some risk away from shareholders.
In addition, it permits the corporate insiders to choose the risk allo-
cation rule without consulting other parties who might be affected.
The law respects this choice unless compelling reasons are shown to
vary from it. This provides the insiders a degree of certainty in
planning, even while it shifts risks to those who did not explicitly
contemplate those risks.
The reasons which courts find compelling to rebut the pre-
sumption of limited liability often relate to the activity of insiders.
Mere ownership of stock (or overlap of ownership in corporate
groups) is not sufficient, nor is overlap of shareholders and direc-
tors (or common directors within a corporate group). More pejora-
tive conduct is required. Undercapitalization, if found by the court,
usually leads to loss of limited liability. Failure to follow corporate
formalities also leads to piercing, but more powerful factors are
demonstrations of lack of substantive separation of the corporation
and its shareholders, and intertwining in the activities of the corpo-
ration and its shareholders.
As the fact patterns move completely away from prior consen-
sual interaction between the parties, the presumption of limited lia-
bility loses even more of its strength. Limited liability cannot serve
a market purpose for corporations whose shares are not publicly
traded. It does not appear to serve the purpose of transferring risk
to a more efficient risk-bearer; few tort victims would choose the
risks involuntarily thrust upon them by a corporation unable to pay
for harm caused by its operation. In this setting, respect for the
shareholder's limited liability provides predictability to shareholders
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in planning their business affairs with whatever encouragement for
investing that predictability might offer. The refusal of courts to
pierce in tort settings demonstrates that this "planning" reason can
be strong enough to influence the piercing result, even when market
or risk-shifting justifications do not apply or cut against respect for
the entity.
The reasons that lead courts to drop the presumption in the
bargain setting-for example, misrepresentation, undercapitaliza-
tion, and failure to follow corporate formalities-also lead to pierc-
ing in tort settings, but they are present in many fewer instances.
The apparently anomalous results of this study, that courts pierce
less often in torts even though the reasons for limited liability ap-
pear less strong, probably reflects the "presumption" structure of
piercing-the-veil law. To pierce the veil in the bargain setting,
something must affirmatively displace the presumption of limited li-
ability. The focus has been on factors (such as misrepresentation or
undercapitalization) which show that insiders have abused the privi-
lege of limited liability. Those factors developed in a bargain set-
ting show up less frequently when there has been no prior
transaction between the parties. Thus, when courts look for reasons
to disregard the presumption, few of the "old reliables" appear. Yet
the justification for limited liability is also weak and the traditional
piercing doctrine does not easily accommodate this change. The
law's use of a presumption of limited liability pushes courts to look
for affirmative reasons to disregard the presumption. Courts are
left ill-equipped to deal with a typical tort situation within a corpo-
rate group when the reasons for limited liability have shrunk to
nothing more than the insiders' value of certainty, and yet no affirm-
ative reasons for piercing are present.
What is significant about the tort cases, therefore, is their rela-
tive infrequency. Not surprisingly, other doctrines, such as succes-
sor liability in products-liability law, have grown to fill some of the
gaps. Thus the silence of the tort numbers may be as significant as
any factors that are present.
Piercing-the-veil cases arising in statutory contexts also illus-
trate the weakening of the presumption of limited liability as the
situation moves away from a bargain context. As in the tort context,
limited liability serves no public market function, nor does it facili-
tate efficient allocation of risks between parties. Again, the primary
issue becomes the value of letting insiders set the allocation of risk
by forming corporations and of giving them the planning certainty
that would come from not disregarding the corporate entity. As was
true with tort, the more common bargain reasons for piercing-mis-
representation, undercapitalization, and absence of corporate for-
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malities-do not occur in these statutory contexts as often as in the
bargain cases.
Yet, unlike the tort situation, the default rule of corporate law
has not been left undisturbed in its respect for the corporate entity
and recognition of the choice made by insiders. Rather, the legisla-
ture, either explicitly or implicitly, has provided additional guidance
on the allocation of risks or benefits available under various statutes.
Sometimes the statute provides an explicit broadening of liability as,
for example, with the securities laws that regulate certain persons
and also those who control, are controlled by, or are controlled in
common with the regulated entity. In other areas, the purpose of
the law may be implicit or may be developed by administrative inter-
pretation. For example, under the labor laws, the question of
whether a corporate form should be disregarded turns not on un-
dercapitalization or other common piercing factors, but on whether
there was a common labor policy among the related companies such
that a failure to pierce would frustrate the specific purpose of the
federal labor laws. 175 Other statutes, like the tax laws, reaffirm the
presumption of limited liability embodied in corporate law, and so
piercing would be expected to occur less frequently.
Thus, this empirical study permits us to see the contextual na-
ture of the piercing-the-corporate-veil question and the structure by
which it operates. Limited liability is a presumptive rule of law that
facilitates the development of public markets for securities, permits
the allocation of risk or benefits between parties, and supports the
certainty of planning by those who have organized the corporation.
Where there are public markets or where all parties to the transac-
tion participated in the allocation of risk, the law declines to disre-
gard the presumption. In other situations, where the greatest effect
of limited liability seems to be only to further the certainty of corpo-
rate insiders' planning, the presumption holds unless the insiders
have engaged in conduct that makes continuing respect of the bar-
gain unfair.
In addressing tort situations, courts should recognize that the
common-law presumption of limited liability was developed to ad-
dress the allocation of risk in bargain, not tort situations, and that
the usual reasons for disregarding the corporate entity do not occur
in tort settings. Courts start with the presumption of limited liabil-
ity, and when none of the usual "suspects" can be found, thatpre-
sumption continues. If this presumption is going to change, it likely
will take legislation or will occur by use of noncorporate legal
doctrines.
175 This law is summarized in P. BLUMBERG, supra note 41, at 396-99.
1991] 1073
1074 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:1036
Indeed, the key element for courts to recognize in statutory
cases is that the legislature has changed the corporate law presump-
tion of limited liability. The focus should not be on the traditional
factors for piercing the veil in a bargain setting, but on the extent to
which a specific statutory scheme either permits or limits a corpo-
rate insider's ability to allocate liability or gain a benefit by forming
a corporation. Piercing the corporate veil will remain a judicially
applied doctrine, but the varying strength of the presumption of
limited liability in different contexts should produce a more under-
standable body of law that has a greater connection to the normative
reasons for limited liability.
